From evolution to co-evolution – An empirical study of the role of innovation, policy and public research in industrial dynamics

In the past decades since Schumpeter’s influential writings economists have pursued research to examine the role of innovation in certain industries on firm as well as on industry level. Researchers describe innovations as the main trigger of industry dynamics, while policy makers argue that research and education are directly linked to economic growth and welfare. Thus, research and education are an important objective of public policy. Firms and public research are regarded as the main actors which are relevant for the creation of new knowledge. This knowledge is finally brought to the market through innovations. What is more, policy makers support innovations. Both actors, i.e. policy makers and researchers, agree that innovation plays a central role but researchers still neglect the role that public policy plays in the field of industrial dynamics. Therefore, the main objective of this work is to learn more about the interdependencies of innovation, policy and public research in industrial dynamics. The overarching research question of this dissertation asks whether it is possible to analyze patterns of industry evolution – from evolution to co-evolution – based on empirical studies of the role of innovation, policy and public research in industrial dynamics. This work starts with a hypothesis-based investigation of traditional approaches of industrial dynamics. Namely, the testing of a basic assumption of the core models of industrial dynamics and the analysis of the evolutionary patterns – though with an industry which is driven by public policy as example. Subsequently it moves to a more explorative approach, investigating co-evolutionary processes. The underlying questions of the research include the following: Do large firms have an advantage because of their size which is attributable to cost spreading? Do firms that plan to grow have more innovations? What role does public policy play for the evolutionary patterns of an industry? Are the same evolutionary patterns observable as those described in the ILC theories? And is it possible to observe regional co-evolutionary processes of science, innovation and industry evolution? Based on two different empirical contexts – namely the laser and the photovoltaic industry – this dissertation tries to answer these questions and combines an evolutionary approach with a co-evolutionary approach. The first chapter starts with an introduction of the topic and the fields this dissertation is based on. The second chapter provides a new test of the Cohen and Klepper (1996) model of cost spreading, which explains the relationship between innovation, firm size and R&D, at the example of the photovoltaic industry in Germany. First, it is analyzed whether the cost spreading mechanism serves as an explanation for size advantages in this industry. This is related to the assumption that the incentives to invest in R&D increase with the ex-ante output. Furthermore, it is investigated whether firms that plan to grow will have more innovative activities. The results indicate that cost spreading serves as an explanation for size advantages in this industry and, furthermore, growth plans lead to higher amount of innovative activities. What is more, the role public policy plays for industry evolution is not finally analyzed in the field of industrial dynamics. In the case of Germany, the introduction of demand inducing policy instruments stimulated market and industry growth. While this policy immediately accelerated market volume, the effect on industry evolution is more ambiguous. Thus, chapter three analyzes this relationship by considering a model of industry evolution, where demand-inducing policies will be discussed as a possible trigger of development. The findings suggest that these instruments can take the same effect as a technical advance to foster the growth of an industry and its shakeout. The fourth chapter explores the regional co-evolution of firm population size, private-sector patenting and public research in the empirical context of German laser research and manufacturing over more than 40 years from the emergence of the industry to the mid-2000s. The qualitative as well as quantitative evidence is suggestive of a co-evolutionary process of mutual interdependence rather than a unidirectional effect of public research on private-sector activities. Chapter five concludes with a summary, the contribution of this work as well as the implications and an outlook of further possible research.

Institutions, Behavior and Evolution

The three articles constituting this thesis are for reasons of content or method related to the following three fields in economics: Behavioral Economics, Evolutionary Game Theory and Formal Institutional Economics. A core element of these fields is the concept of individual preferences. Preferences are of central importance for the conceptional framework to analyze human behavior. They form the foundation for the theory of rational choice which is defined by the determination of the choice set and the selection of the most preferred alternative according to some consistency requirements. The theory of rational choice is based on a very simplified description of the problem of choice (object function and constraints). However, that choices depend on many more factors is for instance propagated by psychological theories and is supported by many empirical and experimental studies. This thesis adds to a better understanding of individual behavior to the extent that the evolution of certain characteristics of preferences and their consequences on human behavior forms the overarching theme of the dissertation. The long-term effect of evolutionary forces on a particular characteristic of importance in the theoretical, empirical and experimental economic literature, the concept of inequality aversion, is subject of the article “The evolution of inequality aversion in a simplified game of life” (Chapter 4). The contribution of the article is the overcoming of a restriction of former approaches to analyze the evolution of preferences in very simple environments. By classifying human interaction into three central economic games, the article provides a first step towards a simplified and sufficiently complete description of the interaction environment. Within such an environment the article characterizes the evolutionary stable preference distribution. One result shows, that the interaction of the aforementioned three classes can stabilize a preference of inequality aversion in the subpopulation which is favored in the problem of redistribution. The two remaining articles are concerned with social norms, which dissemination is determined by medium-run forces of cultural evolution. The article “The impact of market innovations on the evolution of social norms: the sustainability case.“ (Chapter 2) studies the interrelation between product innovations which are relevant from a sustainability perspective and an according social norm in consumption. This relation is based on a conformity bias in consumption and the attempt to avoid cognitive dissonances resulting from non-compliant consumption. Among others, it is shown that a conformity bias on the consumption side can lead to multiple equilibria on the side of norm adoption. The article “Evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas: signaling internalized norms.” (Chapter 3) studies the emergence of cooperation in social dilemmas based on the signaling of social norms. The article provides a potential explanation of cooperative behavior, which does not rely on the assumption of structured populations or on the unmotivated ability of social norms to restrict individual actions or strategy spaces. A comprehensive result of the single articles is the explanation of the phenomenon of partial norm adaption or dissemination of preferences. The plurality of the applied approaches with respect to the proximity to the rational choice approach and regarding the underlying evolutionary mechanics is a particular strength of the thesis. It shows the equality of these approaches in their potential to explain the phenomenon of cooperation in environments that provide material incentives for defective behavior. This also points to the need of a unified framework considering the biological and cultural coevolution of preference patterns.